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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the defining feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—even as this aligns with the new aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a top U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative echoed this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Inconsistencies

This pivot is major, but observers warn it is early to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Strains

Unlike his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Conditional Intervention

An analogous tension emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Experts see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.